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We examine the interplay between monetary and ﬁscal policies in a context where distur-
bances to the public deﬁcit process are a primary source of macroeconomic instability. We
perform simulations of optimal targeting rules on a sticky-price model ` a la Woodford (1997).
Our investigation compares the dynamic adjustment path under inﬂation targeting with that
arising from nominal income growth targeting. When ﬁscal shocks enter the picture, inﬂation
targeting is a superior strategy. In opposition to Jensen (2002)’s results, we show that an in-
ﬂation targeter is capable of bringing about the required degree of interest rate inertia. This
does not occur at the cost of additional nominal instability.
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11 Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact is often called upon to guarantee a smooth startup of the
common monetary policy in the EMU. In a path-breaking contribution to this issue, Woodford
(1997) shows that ﬁscal shocks can have a signiﬁcant impact on the dynamic behavior of
nominal variables. The key intuition leading to such a result is that ﬁscal policy need not
follow a Ricardian path, since proﬂigate governments may not comply with the intertemporal
budget constraint. Thus, a misalignment between the level of outstanding public debt on the
one side, and the present value of future government surpluses on the other shifts households
consumption proﬁles, and generates price instability.
A missing point in Woodford (1997)’s study regards the role of alternative monetary policy
rules in a second-best world, that is when monetary institutions are incapable of perfectly
stabilizing ﬁscal shocks. The pertinence of this issue applies with special strength to the EMU
itself. A huge literature has recently emerged on the so-called ’expansionary ﬁscal contraction
hypothesis’, namely the proposition that public deﬁcit reductions need not exert a negative
eﬀect on economic activity (see Perotti, 1996). The composition of ﬁscal adjustments is often
referred to as the key instrument capable of preventing output from falling after a deﬁcit cut.
Should the Stability Pact be enforced tightly, ﬁscal shocks would partially retain their impact
on nominal variables. The body of literature mentioned earlier stresses that strategies of ﬁscal
retrenchments based on revenue increases are associated with inﬂationary outcomes.
Our analysis focuses on two well-known policy rules, namely inﬂation targeting and nom-
inal income growth targeting. We perform simulations of optimal policy on a simple variant
of Woodford (1997)’s model developed by Natalucci and Pandimiglio (2000). It is intuitively
appealing that a ranking among alternative policy regimes depends on their endogenous prop-
erties. Among others, Jensen (2002) argues that the degree of aggressiveness brought about
by our reference policy rules makes income growth targeting a superior strategy with respect
to inﬂation targeting. We challenge this view by showing that, when ﬁscal shocks enter the
picture, the traditional approach to the evaluation of monetary policy inertia is a misleading
criterion on which assessing the relative performance of policy rules.
In the traditional ‘Ricardian’ analysis of ﬁscal policy, government deﬁcits have no impact
on nominal variables. Households are assumed to formulate consumption decisions so as to
insulate aggregate saving from ﬁscal shocks. The model employed here is instead grounded on
the so-called ‘ﬁscal theory of price level determination’. The introduction of price rigidities
in the context of typically ‘Ricardian’ assumption - rational expectations, lump-sum taxation
2and frictionless markets (Woodford, 1997) - ampliﬁes the impact of ﬁscal policy on the demand
side of the economy. In other words, ﬁscal shocks do shift the intertemporal budget constraint
of households through the wealth eﬀect of public debt, and aﬀect both inﬂation and the output
gap at the aggregate level.
Once a debt shock takes place, the underlying adjustment mechanism at work to bring
the economy back to equilibrium depends on the sign of the initial reaction of the monetary
authority. Inﬂation targeters prefer a ‘tougher’ stance at the beginning of the simulation, in
the sense that they put stronger eﬀorts in eliminating the roots of instability. In order to
oﬀset consumption swings, they promote faster reductions of public debt by allowing the real
interest rate to fall below zero. The paper shows that this strategy ensures a fast convergence
toward the steady state at no cost of additional macroeconomic instability. On the other hand,
monetary policy under nominal income growth targeting contemplates a diﬀerent shape of the
adjustment path, as interest rates bear a positive sign after the shock has taken place. The
long-term equilibrium is achieved more gradually than under inﬂation targeting.
Strikingly, our numerical results demonstrate that the diﬀerence in the macroeconomic out-
comes of the two policy strategies do not originate from the extent of interest rate smoothing,
that is a sluggish adjustment of real interest rates. Rather, the explaining factor we account
for consists in the quality of the monetary policy response. Central banks need not rely
merely on the quantitative aspect of policy changes when public debt instability contributes
to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. The intuition behind this reasoning is that there are several
channels through which monetary policy can limit public debt swings. We stress the role of
real interest expenditures, seignorage revenues, and the reduction of nominal debt through
inﬂation. The endogenous properties of our monetary policy rules interact with these factors
under the quest for stability. The ‘aggressiveness’ of inﬂation targeting referred to above is
beneﬁcial for it immediately prevents an unstable public debt from turning into unstable inﬂa-
tion. The endogenous money supply rule plays a stronger role in a growing economy, namely
when public debt changes keep on boosting aggregate demand throughout the adjustment
path. But, in this case, also the inﬂation rate keep on displaying a positive sign.
Jensen (2002) compares inﬂation and nominal income targeting by using a ‘New-Keynesian’
macromodel with nominal rigidities calibrated to ﬁt US data. Diﬀerently from our framework,
any scope for ﬁscal shocks is neglected. Jensen (2002)’s simulations indicate that discretionary
inﬂation targeting leads to an excessive stability of output, but too volatile inﬂation relative
to the commitment solution. This is the so-called ’stabilization bias’ of inﬂation targeters.
Bringing about a larger interest rate inertia, nominal income growth targeting under discre-
3tion produces more stable inﬂation and more volatile output than inﬂation targeting, thus
bringing the discretionary equilibrium closer to the commitment one. We demonstrate that
the inclusion of public debt reverses this outcome. Owing to a milder interest rate stance to-
wards the removal of instability, the volatility of inﬂation is exacerbated under nominal income
targeting with respect to inﬂation targeting. Puzzingly, the ’stabilization bias’ of monetary
policy manifests itself in an alternative way when public debt matters for aggregate demand.
The hidden inertia of nominal income targeting acknowledged in Jensen (2002) turns out to
be destabilizing in our model, for it implies moderate changes of the real interest rates. And
their oﬀsetting power on real debt swings is shown to be relatively low.
The empirical relevance of the scenarios described in this paper is magniﬁed in a common
currency area, where monetary policy can exert diﬀerent eﬀects at the ‘regional’ - i.e. national -
level. Member countries of a monetary union may have diverging rates of inﬂation. Obviously,
persistent inﬂation diﬀerentials cannot be supported unless serious distortions to the allocation
of resources are tolerated. In the short run, inﬂation can be interpreted as a beneﬁcial factor
inducing international adjustment - the so-called Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. Acknowledging
the case for divergent inﬂation rates also means accounting for diﬀerent national real rates of
interest within a monetary union.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the log-linearized version of our
Woodford (1997)-type model. The formalization of the monetary policy regimes under in-
vestigation is discussed in section 3, where the technical steps involved in the evaluation of
targeting rules are also discussed. Section 4.1 outlines the main methodological aspects of
our study. In particular, section 4.2 deﬁnes the calibration properties of the model. Optimal
policy under commitment is scrutinized in section 5. The more realistic case of discretionary
monetary policy is considered in section 6.1. In section 6.2, we perform a sensitivity analysis
of the results under discretion. Section 7 draws up some concluding remarks. Three method-
ological appendixes are also included. Appendix A formulates the state-space representation
of the model, and appendix B deals with the unconditional covariance matrix of the target
variables under discretion.
2 A microfounded model with sticky prices
The amended model ` a la Woodford is characterized by a measure of identical inﬁnitely-lived
households. Each of them acts as the monopolistic supplier of a single diﬀerentiated good. The
intertemporal utility function of households has a logarithmic form in terms of consumption
4and public expenditure, and a power form with respect to real money and the private supply of
production goods. These functional assumptions by Natalucci and Pandimiglio (2000) satisfy
the general conditions for model solution laid down by Woodford (1997). On the supply side,
a random fraction of agents is assigned a ﬁxed probability of changing the current-period
price.
The microfounded model is solved by log-linearizing the variables around their steady
states. After including stochastic shocks in the resulting equations, we obtain:
b yt = ¡b r
r
t + Etb yt+1 + u
y
t; (1)
b ¼t = ¸b yt + ¯Etb ¼t+1 + u
¼
t : (2)
A clariﬁcation on the notation is due at this point of the discussion. The variables bearing a
hat are expressed as log-deviations from the steady state.
The IS relationship of equation 1 derives from the intertemporal consumption Euler equa-
tion of the representative household. It is noteworthy that the solution to the consump-
tion/saving decision problem assumes the existence of one-period risk-free government bills as
the only interest-bearing ﬁnancial asset. The elasticity of the output gap b yt to the ex-ante real
interest rate b r r
t corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
Owing to the logarithmic utility function of the relevant term, such elasticity turns out with
a positive unit value.
Equation 2 represents an expectations-augmented Phillips curve with steady-state inﬂation
¼t ´ Pt
Pt¡1. The parameter ¯ is the subjective discount factor entering households’ utility.
Although arising as a convolution of several deep parameters, the term ¸ bears the intuitive
interpretation of trade-oﬀ measure between output and inﬂation. Interestingly such a trade-
oﬀ is determined mainly by the degree of price rigidity. For instance, when all the prices are
assumed to be ﬁxed, ¸ is equal to zero, and the inﬂation rate does not vary as a function of
output deviations from trend. With perfectly ﬂexible prices, ¸ is inﬁnitely large.
We assume that the stochastic disturbances u
y
t and u¼
t follow exogenous ﬁrst-order autore-














with 0 · [½t; ½¼] < 1. Both ²
y
t+1 and ²¼
t+1 are white noise processes with null means and
ﬁnite variances ¾2
y and ¾2
¼, respectively. The shock persistence in both b yt and b ¼t accounts for
the well-documented serial correlation in the impact - both real and nominal - of monetary
5policy (see S¨ oderlind, 2001). Clarida et al. (1999) also show that persistent cost disturbances
represent a key factor in the choice of the optimal monetary policy arrangement.








t ¡ Etb ¼t+1: (4)
The term b r n
t represents the log-linearized monetary policy instrument used by the central
bank - i.e. systematic policy -, while ur
t indicates a stochastic policy shock. Again, we assume









t+1 is drawn from a standardized normal distribution with variance ¾2
r.




b yt ¡ Ãb r
n
t : (6)
The term " arises from the ratio between the elasticity of money demand with respect to the
opportunity cost of holding money, and the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitu-




where rn = 1
¯ is the steady-state nominal rate of interest. Hence, Ã can be interpreted as the
rate of time preference, trading oﬀ consumers’ impatience for current consumption with the
propensity to hold cash.
The evolution of real public debt is determined by














b Dt + ° (b mt¡1 ¡ b mt ¡ b ¼t): (7)
The parameter ° ´ m
¯b measures the share of money holdings in ﬁnancial wealth, with m = Mt
Pt
and b = Bt
Pt¡1 as money balances and real debt in the long run.
To close the model, the real primary deﬁcit Dt has the law of motion




t is a white noise with variance ¾2
d. The parameter ½d captures the persistence of
primary deﬁcit. In order to rule out any explosive behavior of the deﬁcit process, we impose
the restriction that j½dj < 1. The reader should note that equation 8 implies that neither the
current level of public debt, nor the interest rate exert any impact on the evolution of the
ﬁscal deﬁcit.
63 Monetary policy regimes
We study the conduct of interest rate policy according to two monetary regimes, namely
inﬂation targeting and nominal income growth targeting. Our deﬁnition of targeting rules
draws on the theoretical framework developed by Svensson (1999). In other words, we interpret
the setup of monetary policy as a function of some predetermined goals to be achieved by the
policymaker. This process takes the form of minimizing the state-independent loss functions
reported in table 1.
Regime Loss function
IT Á¼ (b ¼t ¡ ¼)







NIT Ág (b gt ¡ g)







Table 1: Single-period loss functions for alternative monetary policy regimes.
The baseline deﬁnition of nominal income growth relies on the following expression:
b gt ´ b ¼t + b yt ¡ b yt¡1:
Assuming a constant level of trend output, we obtain that b gt is a mere indicator of nominal
GDP growth. In the more realistic case of a time-varying level of trend output, b gt represents
”nominal income growth relative to real trend output growth” (Jensen, 2002).
We consider only ﬂexible monetary policy rules. Thus, each loss function contains ad-
ditional targets with respect to the ones strictly involved in its formulation. Although the
case for a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is well established in the literature, a ﬂexible version of
nominal income growth targeting might appear theoretically groundless. Indeed, this formal-
ization is employed both in Jensen (2002), and Walsh (2002) with the reasoning that it does
not disregard the underlying logic of the monetary policy strategy.
Both loss functions in table 1 include an objective of interest rate smoothing. Jensen
(2002) demonstrates that monetary policy under ‘standard’ income growth targeting generates
endogenous inertia in the interest rate adjustment. The introduction of an explicit target of
interest rate smoothing can then be motivated with the general need for safeguarding ﬁnancial
markets stability. In our context, there is the ad-hoc concern of preventing serially-correlated
shocks from having a destabilizing impact well beyond reasonability.
7It is worth pointing out that we assume null target values for our main goal variables, that
is
¼ ´ g = 0: (9)
The relation 9 is inherently coherent, since targeting b g at zero implies aiming at a nominal
GDP growth equal to trend output growth. In turn, this behavior is consistent with a null
target rate of inﬂation. A ﬁnal remark is needed. Table 1 is based on the assumption of a
target output gap equal to zero. This prevents the model from exhibiting an inﬂationary bias
` a la Barro and Gordon (1983).
3.1 Central bank preferences and optimal monetary policy










0. Predetermined state variables are collected into x1t, while x2t includes
forward-looking variables. The vector of disturbances to the predetermined variables is indi-
cated as »t+1. The monetary policy instrument - b rn
t in our model - is denoted by it. Further
details on the representation of the model can be found in appendix A.






subject to the constraint of equation 10, with 0 < ± < 1 as the society’s discount factor. Each




where K is a weighing matrix of preference parameters. The goal variables are collected into
zt. They are linked both to the state variables, and the nominal interest rate through the
transition equation
zt = Cxxt + Ciit: (13)
83.2 The solution algorithm
At this point, the problem is expressed as a dynamic program with expectational terms.
The solution strategy for the commitment case follows S¨ oderlind (1999) in expressing the
ﬁrst-order conditions as a Vector-Autoregressive System - VAR(1) - of rational expectation
equations. The method developed by Klein (2000) is then applied to the resulting model.
The generalized Schur decomposition is used to isolate the block of stable roots from that of
unstable and nearly-stable roots. Finally, the standard saddle-path condition of Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) for the uniqueness of solutions is imposed. After the steady-state coeﬃcient
matrix of the VAR(1) system has been found, it is straightforward to compute the optimal
interest rate rule as a function of the state variables. No closed-form solution exists for
the model with discretionary policy. Hence, numerical iteration is applied on a recursive
representation of the value function to solve for stable coeﬃcients (see S¨ oderlind, 1999).













F ¶ with ¶ = c;d are coeﬃcient matrices. In the commitment case, the central bank acts as a
Stackelberg leader by internalizing the eﬀects of its actions on the private sector’s expectations.
The policy stance is decided once for all over the period. As a result, the optimal interest
rate - ic
t - depends on both the Lagrange multipliers - ½2t - associated to the forward-looking
variables, and the predetermined variables. Discretionary policy - id
t - takes, instead, the
expectations of agents as given. In other words, the central bank does not internalize the
impact of monetary policy over agents’ expectations - the so-called “maximization within
the period”. The policymaker revises its actions every period, and the state of the economy
collapses to the predetermined variables only.
A key point is worth stressing. Both the primary deﬁcit and the public debt enter the
vector x1t. One might thus be tempted to think of the resulting monetary policy stance as
non-autonomous with respect to the needs of government solvency. In opposition to this view,
we notice that the loss functions of the central bank do not include any ﬁscal variable. Rather,
the surrounding economic environment is subject to ﬁscal proﬂigacy.
As ± approaches unity, the value of the expression 11 becomes proportional to the sec-
ond moments of the variables entering the central bank’s loss function (see Rudebusch and
Svensson, 1999):
ELIT = Á¼Var[b ¼t] + Áy;ITVar[b yt] + Ái;ITVar[∆r
n
t ]; (14)
9ELNIT = ÁgVar[b gt] + Áy;NITVar[b yt] + Ái;NITVar[∆r
n
t ]: (15)
After the model has been solved, the unconditional variances of the goal variables can be used
to evaluate equation 14 and 15. Instead, we calculate the exact value of each loss function by







Àt = ± trace(Vt+1Σ) + ±EtÀt+1;
and V is a symmetric matrix to be determined.
The results of this paper have been obtained by modifying the Matlab routines provided
by Paul S¨ oderlind. The code is available from the author upon request.
4 Methodological issues
4.1 Methodology
We are interested in investigating the monetary policy implications of an autarchic ﬁscal
policymaker. In doing so, we take the commitment solutions as a preliminary ground on
which assessing the main properties of our model. Then, we turn our attention to the more
realistic scenario of optimal monetary policy under discretion. We concentrate on the welfare
impact of parameter deviations from their baseline setup when primary deﬁcit shocks occur.
Since we assume that the central bank’s loss function corresponds to the one of the society,
we compare its equilibrium values under alternative monetary regimes.
The variances of all the white noise terms in the model, and the correlation coeﬃcients of
the AR disturbances deﬁned in 3 account for uncertainty on the state of the economy. An
example of this methodological application can be found in Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001),
who discuss the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on the optimal design of interest rate
rules. Hence, by studying how the optimal monetary policy regime changes as a function of
these parameters, we also analyze the robustness properties of the various policy rules in a
framework including ﬁscal shocks.
The reader should notice that only non-restricted rules for the determination of optimal
policy are considered in solving the model. Despite their relevance in day-to-day policymaking,
we provide no account for Taylor-type rules.
104.2 Calibration
We assign the parameter values as they are already deﬁned in the current literature. Our aim
is not to provide for either a rigorous calibration of the model, or empirical estimates capable
of capturing the dynamic properties of any economic time series. The underlying criterion of
our calibration strategy is simply to avoid unreasonable settings. Thus, the numerical results
of the following analysis should be interpreted as merely indicative.
¸ ¯ " Ã ° ±
0.3 0.95 1 0.95 0.1 0.99
Table 2: Baseline parameter conﬁguration of the stochastic equations. Source: Woodford
(1997).
The coeﬃcient values in table 2 are taken from Woodford (1997). The compound term
¸ follows from econometric studies based on US data. Both the discount factor ¯, and the
rate of time preferences Ã are consistent with current rates of return. Assuming that both
the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution, and the money-demand elasticity to
the opportunity cost of holding money are equal to one, we get a unit value for " too. The
parameter ° is calibrated on the relative size of the US monetary base. Finally, the society’s







0.3 0.015 0.3 0.015 0.92 0.13 0.6 0.01
Table 3: Baseline parameters entering the shock terms. Sources: various authors.
The source for the settings of the shock disturbances of both the output and the inﬂation
equations is Walsh (2002). Such a conﬁguration relies on earlier studies by Jensen (2002)
and McCallum and Nelson (1999). The stochastic properties of the monetary policy shocks
are identiﬁed by Rudebusch (2001). He estimates a Taylor rule on US data allowing for ﬁrst-
order serial correlation. As for the evolution of the deﬁcit process, we choose the value already
assigned by Woodford (1997) to the autocorrelation coeﬃcient ½d. We also assume that the
stochastic disturbance ud
t is drawn from a standardized normal distribution (see table 3).
11Áy;IT Ái;IT Áy;NIT Ái;NIT Á¼ Ág
1 0.5 1 0.5 1 1
Table 4: Baseline weights of target variables.
Diﬀerently from Jensen (2002), the weights on the target variables of each period loss
function are not optimized. Instead, they have been assigned the standard values used by
both Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2001).
5 Impulse responses under commitment
This section illustrates the main features of the monetary regimes in a context where the
central bank can commit to a certain path of policies once for all. The aim is to provide the
ground for key insights against which the eﬀects of deviations from baseline parameters can
be assessed.
The reader should also be aware that two diﬀerent measure of interest rate inertia will be
introduced for the rest of the paper. In particular, while commenting on the ﬁgures, we will
still refer to ‘inertia’ in terms of ex-ante real interest rates as in the previous section. That is
a more appealing measure of the impact of monetary policy on output. On the contrary, the
numerical results reported in the forthcoming tables refers to inertia as the period-to-period
change in the nominal interest rate. There we conform to the standard practice in studies of
sluggish interest rate behavior.
The impulse-response functions are traced by simulating the model under alternative con-
ﬁgurations of the disturbance vector 21 on page 25. We consider each type of shock separately
from the others. The upper-left panel of ﬁgure 1 plots the dynamic response of selected vari-
ables to a demand shock under inﬂation targeting. Notwithstanding positive inﬂation expec-
tations, the ex-ante real interest rate increases steadily after the shock has taken place. As
a result, output swings are stabilized almost completely in the short run, albeit not at long
horizons. Positive real interest rates generate an upsurge in real public debt, thus boosting
households’ consumption via the wealth channel. In the end, this produces a persistent - and
declining - deviation of inﬂation from steady state.
Remarkable diﬀerences emerge between the dynamic path of adjustment outlined earlier
and the one arising from nominal income growth targeting (see ﬁgure 2 on page 14). The initial
response of the central bank is tougher when income growth determines monetary policy. The
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Figure 1: Impulse-response functions under commitment, inﬂation targeting.
inertial behavior of the real interest rate prevents the output gap from becoming negative.
Furthermore, the convergence towards the stationary solution of the model is achieved at a
slower pace than under inﬂation targeting.
When the economy is subject to persistent cost-push shocks, the output gap-inﬂation
tradeoﬀ of the central bank worsens. It is striking that the upper-right panels of ﬁgures 1 and
2 show no divergences among the resulting optimal paths. Thus, there are virtually no gains
in terms of economic performance from discriminating between inﬂation targeting and income
growth targeting. Like in Jensen (2002), optimal policy is characterized by a high degree
of persistence. The real interest rate steps on a declining trajectory, and acquires negative
values. This outcome should be entirely attributed to the assumed parameter structures of the
policymaker’s loss functions, implying strong preferences for output gap stabilization under
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Figure 2: Impulse-response functions under commitment, nominal income growth
targeting.
both policy regimes.
The dynamic impact of a stochastic monetary policy shock is depicted in the lower-left
panels of ﬁgures 1 and 2. Although the adjustment paths move along common trajectories,
a few noticeable diﬀerences can be stressed. A central bank committed to an inﬂation target
imparts a more severe downturn to the output gap at the beginning of the simulation. On
the other hand, a slightly higher degree of monetary policy inertia emerges under income
growth targeting with respect to inﬂation targeting. The existence of a sluggish interest rate
adjustment in both regimes can be interpreted under the light of Jensen (2002)’s results. A
persistent negative output gap keeps inﬂation expectations low, thus improving the output
gap-inﬂation tradeoﬀ.
14Diﬀerently from the case of a cost-push disturbance, primary deﬁcit shocks generate an
upswing both in output and inﬂation (see the lower-right panels of ﬁgures 1 and 2). Thus, we
replicate the main analytical ﬁnding of Woodford (1997), namely that ﬁscal policy can exert
non-Ricardian eﬀects despite all the standard assumptions underlying rational expectations
equilibria. What makes the diﬀerence with respect to conventional microfounded models is
the positive wealth impact on household’s consumption of an increase in public debt. At both
unchanged prices and interest rates, a misalignment between the present value of outstanding
government liabilities and the present value of public primary surpluses takes place. As a re-
sult, the reader should notice that only when compliance with the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint is restored, can the economy return to its stationary equilibrium.
Three diﬀerent adjustment channels can be exploited to hamper deviations from the steady
state (see Woodford, 1997). Falling real interest rates ease the ﬁnancial burden due to debt
servicing costs. Increased inﬂationary pressures reduce the real value of outstanding debt.
Furthermore, in the context of a growing economy, seignorage revenues are generated by the
endogenous money supply rule.
It is striking that the ﬁrst mechanism outlined earlier plays a stronger role under inﬂation
targeting than under income growth targeting, as the real rate of interest becomes negative
after the shock is realized. The inﬂation rate is then characterized by a steeper initial drop. At
the end of the simulation period, a central bank caring about GDP growth generates higher
real interest rates with respect to an inﬂation targeter. Again, inertial behavior emerges
clearly as the predominant property of a monetary policy strategy centered around nominal
income growth. This translates into a larger role for seignorage-based adjustment.
6 Optimal policy under discretion
In order to point out the main qualitative diﬀerences between targeting regimes, we now turn
our attention to the case when the representative central bank does not internalize the eﬀects
of its policy actions.
6.1 Results under baseline parameters
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse responses of selected variables under discretionary inﬂa-
tion targeting and income growth targeting, respectively. Once we compare such plots with
the corresponding ones under commitment, we immediately notice that both regimes do not
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions under discretion, inﬂation targeting.
replicate the inertial behavior that characterizes them under commitment. Thus, we extend
the recent ﬁndings by Jensen (2002), who concentrates on the role of cost-push shocks for the
choice of the optimal monetary arrangement.
The interest rate adjustment produced by nominal income growth targeting tends to be
more sluggish than the one displayed by inﬂation targeting. This general consideration ﬁnds
less clear cut evidence in the case of a sudden drop in the government primary surplus.
The opposite signs of the initial impulse responses of the interest rate in the two regimes
determine the quality of the adjustment in the following periods. Under income growth
targeting, equilibrium is restored mainly through endogenous money supply changes, whereas
it is the interest rate channel that plays a key role under inﬂation targeting.
Table 5 on page 18 reports some descriptive statistics under baseline parameters. Two
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions under discretion, nominal income growth tar-
geting.
preliminary aspects are worth emphasizing. It should be stressed that the society’s losses are
normalized by 100, thus implying substantial welfare drops in level. This aspect is clearly
related to the fact that we are studying the available options for monetary policy in a second-
best world, i.e. in a setting where factors leading to suboptimal economic outcomes prevail.
On the same ground, we evaluate the variability of the interest rate in a diﬀerent fashion from
Jensen (2002). Our indicator provides for an exact measure of the variance of the real interest
rate, whereas Jensen (2002) calculates the simulated standard deviation of such a variable.
Strikingly, inﬂation targeting over-performs with respect to nominal income growth tar-
geting. Although it generates wider output gap ﬂuctuations, inﬂation targeting succeeds in
achieving both more stable inﬂation, and smaller interest rate variability. These conclusions
17IT NIT
Society’s loss (/100) 4.6319 8.7810
S.d. of ¼t 0.9542 1.3052
S.d. of yt 1.9345 1.7607
S.d. of ∆it 1.3871 2.0317
Table 5: Analytical results under baseline discretionary policy.
are at odds with Jensen (2002), who obtains opposite results. Two factors can be consid-
ered for explaining our puzzling results. One can assert that the inclusion of an interest rate
smoothing objective in the context of inﬂation targeting greatly aﬀects the ranking among
alternative policies. Indeed, we argue in favor of a deeper rationale.
Woodford (1997)’s model encompasses the traditional adjustment mechanisms based on
the labor market performance. Public debt plays a central role in determining the convergence
of the model towards its long-term equilibrium. As a result, the impact of changes of key
variables on the debt path shapes the optimal response by the monetary authority.
Given multiple persistent shocks, the optimality of inﬂation targeting consists in imparting
a stronger policy shock at the beginning of the simulation period. This abates inﬂationary
expectations, and guarantees a faster achievement of stationary solutions. Such a process takes
place more forward in time under income growth targeting, since the central bank prefers a
milder stance at the beginning of the experiment.
When dealing with disturbances to the deﬁcit process, inﬂation targeters let the real
interest rate fall below zero both under commitment and under discretion. This prevents
inﬂation from worsening any further. The key point is that the initial sign of the monetary
policy response determines the following variation of macroeconomics variables. The emerging
negative correlation between the rate of inﬂation and the real rate of interest reﬂects the
aggressiveness of monetary policy under inﬂation targeting. But such an aggressiveness does
not come at the cost of additional variability of either rates, since it relies on the quality of
the impact rather than on quantitative aspects.
18IT NIT
Society’s loss (/100) 3.2686 6.1898
S.d. of ¼t 1.3934 1.6438
S.d. of yt 1.1602 0.9460
S.d. of ∆it 1.4847 2.2935
Table 6: Deviation from baseline: higher inﬂation elasticity to the output gap (¸ = 0:9).
6.2 Deviations from baseline parameters
The virtues of inﬂation targeting vis-` a-vis income growth targeting are conﬁrmed by the
battery of sensitivity tests that follows. The baseline results of the simulations are robust with
respect to variations of the inﬂation elasticity to the output gap. With a higher elasticity,
the ranking among volatilities of diﬀerent variables remains unchanged (see table 6). On
the other hand, when a lower inﬂation sensitivity to business cycle ﬂuctuations is at stake,
nominal income growth targeting is capable of generating a smoother path of interest rates.
Additional evidence from table 11 on page 22 shows that this occurs at the cost of larger
output swings than under inﬂation targeting. Again, such puzzling results can be explained
by referring to the impact of primary deﬁcit shocks on optimal policy. A central banker caring
about nominal growth subscribes to a more aggressive stance than under baseline parameters
(see ﬁgure 5 on page 23). But that does not imply raising interest rates any further. Jensen
(2002) oﬀers a counter-intuitive motivation by noticing that ”any regime will perform equally
bad in terms of stabilizing inﬂation (...) when the trade-oﬀ reaches the limit where the output
gap has virtually no eﬀect on inﬂation”.
Changes in the degree of forward-looking adjustment of the inﬂation process aﬀect the
persistence of disturbances through two channels. A supply-side impact arises from the in-
corporation of a portion of current inﬂation into the nominal contracts negotiated in each
period. The endogenous persistence of shocks is also a function of the parameters determin-
ing the evolution of the public debt. At a reduced degree of inﬂation forward lookingness,
the emerging pattern of behavior of macroeconomic variables is diﬀerent from the one of a
lower-than-baseline inﬂation elasticity to the output gap (see table 7). The variance of inﬂa-
tion is strongly reduced. On the other hand, output variability becomes larger than inﬂation
variability in both policy regimes. The alleged parameter shift plays in favor of a stronger
net impact of deﬁcit shocks, i.e. the debt-induced eﬀect is larger than the supply-side impact.
Unsurprisingly, a rational central banker puts a counterweight against these destabilizing
19IT NIT
Society’s loss (/100) 0.6102 1.4739
S.d. of ¼t 0.2565 0.3142
S.d. of yt 0.7206 0.7359
S.d. of ∆it 1.5545 1.5937




Society’s loss (/100) 0.1551 0.1664
S.d. of ¼t 0.2681 0.2669
S.d. of yt 0.1641 0.1115
S.d. of ∆it 2.1185 2.2070
Table 8: Deviation from baseline: higher public debt elasticity to seignorage revenues (° =
0:7).
An increase in the elasticity of public debt to seignorage revenues leads to a dramatic
change of the qualitative aspects of monetary policy setting. Although the ranking among
monetary policy regimes is the same as under baseline, it is intriguing that the variance of
inﬂation under income growth targeting turns out lower than under inﬂation targeting (see
table 8). Figure 6(a) on page 23 shows that a central bank caring mainly about inﬂation
exploits the inﬂation channel, rather than the interest rate one, in order to bring about
the required reduction of public debt. The money-based adjustment operating under GDP
growth targeting is strengthened in the current framework. We stress this aspect in order
to understand better the development induced by the assumed parameter shift. A given
reduction of inﬂation can be bought at the cost of a smaller money supply increase, i.e. via
a more gradual drop of the public debt level. Thus, the endogenous inertia characterizing
income growth targeting results in lower inﬂation variability than under alternative regimes.
We now move our attention to the role of the preference parameters of the monetary
authority. Table 9 shows the numerical eﬀects of variations of the weight assigned to the
output objective in each policy regime. The robustness of our baseline results is strikingly
20IT(1) NIT(1) IT(2) NIT(2)
Society’s loss (/100) 8.1262 11.8739 1.3673 6.1408
S.d. of ¼t 0.9863 1.2884 0.8847 1.3074
S.d. of yt 1.9014 1.7649 2.0268 1.7684
S.d. of ∆it 1.4000 1.9852 1.4726 2.0227
Table 9: Deviation from baseline: diﬀerent weights on the output objective ((1) Áy;IT =
Áy;NIT = 2; (2) Áy;IT ´ Áy;NIT = 0:125).
IT NIT
Society’s loss (/100) 4.4058 8.9126
S.d. of ¼t 0.7532 1.2932
S.d. of yt 1.9711 1.8074
S.d. of ∆it 2.0089 1.9333
Table 10: Deviation from baseline: no weight on interest rate smoothing objective (Ái;IT ´
Ái;NIT = 0).
conﬁrmed.
The main properties of inﬂation targeting hold even when the central bank’s loss function
excludes an explicit objective of interest rate smoothing (see table 10). On the other hand,
nominal income growth targeting exhibits its main virtue of sluggish adjustment of nominal
interest rates, as accounted for by Jensen (2002). The well-established ﬁnding on the pre-
dominant aggressiveness of inﬂation targeting is also supported by the dynamic path of the
key macroeconomic aggregates following a ﬁscal shock (see ﬁgure 7 on page 24). All in all,
the available evidence points to the conclusion that deﬁcit disturbances play a key role in our
analysis. Endogenous interest rate smoothing does shape heavily the conduct of monetary
policy, although it is not able to generate sensible results by itself.
7 Conclusion
This paper brings evidence in favor of inﬂation targeting as a superior monetary policy strat-
egy in a second-best world. By running simulations on a microfounded model ` a la Woodford
(1997), we demonstrate that the alleged aggressiveness of inﬂation targeters need not gener-
21IT NIT
Society’s loss (/100) 7.8605 15.8995
S.d. of ¼t 0.4123 0.5736
S.d. of yt 2.6908 2.7654
S.d. of ∆it 2.1333 1.3947
Table 11: Deviation from baseline: lower inﬂation elasticity to output gap (¸ = 0:1).
ate a suboptimal degree of interest rate inertia. When ﬁscal shocks are a source of nominal
instability, the proposition of Ricardian equivalence does not hold any longer. A policy of
falling rates of interest is then required to let the government comply with its intertempo-
ral budget constraint. Since a central bank caring about nominal income growth aims at
a slow convergence towards steady-state output, it fails to bring about the appropriate de-
gree of aggressiveness. As a result, macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are exacerbated rather than
dampened.
We acknowledge that our study might be extended in several ways. The inclusion of opti-
mized coeﬃcients in the targeting rules would provide a more solid ground on which assessing
alternative ﬁndings. Furthermore, a careful analysis of such parameters along the lines devel-
oped by Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001) might reveal additional robustness properties of our
work. A further point of investigation regards the introduction of diﬀerent functional forms
with respect to the ones assessed in the sensitivity analysis. In particular, Rudebusch (2000)
ﬁnds that inertia in inﬂation adjustment plays a key role in determining the ranking among
policy rules.
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of lower inﬂation elasticity to output gap (¸ = 0:1) under nominal
income growth targeting.
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(a) Inﬂation targeting
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(b) Nominal income growth targeting
Figure 6: Eﬀects of higher public debt elasticity to seignorage (° = 0:7).
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(b) Nominal income growth targeting
Figure 7: Eﬀects of no interest rate-smoothing objective (Ái;NIT ´ Ái;IT = 0).
24A State-space representation of the model



























= Axt + Bit + »t+1; (17)
where A = A
¡1
0 A1, B = A
¡1
0 B1, and »t+1 = A
¡1
0 e »t+1. From this deﬁnition of the structural
disturbance vector, it follows that





The target variables are traditionally expressed as a linear combination of both xt and ut:
zt = Cxxt + Ciit: (18)














x2t ´ [b yt; b ¼t]
0 ; (20)
















The formulation of x1t exploits the recursive property of the deﬁcit process 8 on page 6. The
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The state space form of the model under nominal income growth targeting follows from
marginal changes with respect to the one under inﬂation targeting. It is straightforward to
notice that no modiﬁcations of the state variables deﬁned earlier are needed. As a result,
the coeﬃcients matrices are unchanged. Only the transition equation 18 is characterized in a
diﬀerent fashion. The vector of target variables is re-written as
z
NIT
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26B Unconditional covariances under discretionary policy
In order to evaluate the quantitative performance of our policy rules, we need to calculate the
unconditional covariance matrix of the target variables. After a stable decision is computed,
we express the ﬁrst line of the constraint 17 as
x1t+1 = Γdx1t + ²t+1; (28)
with
Γd ´ (A11 + A12N ¡ B1F):





1 ¡ Γd ­ Γd
i¡1
vec(Σ²): (29)
After including the converged values of x2t and it into the deﬁnition of the target variables,
we obtain
zt = [Cx1 + Cx2N + CiF]x1t: (30)





Cd ´ [Cx1 + Cx2N + CiF]: (32)
The reader should notice that the variance of the inﬂation rate under nominal income growth
targeting does not enter any of the covariance matrices outlined earlier. It can instead be
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